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Abstract  
Frictional costs are defined as the disutility related to the conduct of an online transaction. Thus, 
frictional costs can accrue through the consumer‘s decision-making process prior to an online 
transaction, e.g., bidding in interactive pricing mechanisms like auctions. We present two models for 
the measurement of frictional costs in Name-Your-Own-Price auctions where these costs can either be 
measured through a discount factor or in absolute values. We compare the fit and estimation results of 
these models by analyzing bidding data from a German NYOP seller. Our results show that both 
models are equally parsimonious, explain a comparable fraction of variance and both models yield 
robust and reasonable parameter estimates. 
Keywords: Frictional Costs, Electronic Commerce, Name-Your-Own-Price. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has changed the way business is conducted in many ways. For example, in the field of 
pricing, the possibility to directly interact with a trading partner has given rise to new mechanisms 
previously unknown in the offline world. One such interactive pricing mechanism is the Name-Your-
Own-Price auction (NYOP), which lets both buyer and seller influence the price of a product. The 
seller offers products in his online shop but does not make a take-it-or-leave-it-offer by posting a fixed 
price. In contrast he allows prospective buyers to make an offer which in turn the seller can accept or 
reject. Depending on the design of the mechanism, single bidding or multiple bidding may be allowed. 
NYOP was introduced by Priceline in 1998 and is used to sell flight tickets, or to let hotel rooms and 
rental cars.  
Recently, eBay introduced a feature called “Best Offer” which is basically similar to NYOP applied by 
Priceline. At Priceline, however, only a single bid is possible that is then tested against some 
unrevealed threshold price. If the bid surpasses the secret threshold price, the bid is accepted by the 
system, the credit card is immediately charged and the transaction process is initiated. At eBay, sellers 
can customize the mechanism and define thresholds where the system automatically accepts or rejects 
an offer, or they can specify a range in which the seller decides on rejection/acceptance manually. A 
compendious analysis of recent ongoing auctions on the US and German websites of eBay found that 
about 9% of auctions listed on eBay made use of the Best Offer feature. 
These mechanisms, as well as other auction mechanisms, further provide the seller with information 
for market research purposes, since the individual bidding behaviour reveals interesting information 
about the buyers. In contrast to fixed prices the seller can also learn something from rejected offers 
when he applies interactive pricing mechanisms. The seller may calculate the demand function for his 
product based on the bids even when he has to reject some bids. Moreover interactive pricing yields 
price differentiation among buyers based on their varying bid amounts, thus increasing profits. 
Previous research in Information Systems and Marketing revealed that microeconomic models can be 
used to derive information about the bidders’ true willingness-to-pay, their beliefs and frictional costs 
that prospective buyers face when they think about their optimal bids and finally submit their bids 
(Spann, Skiera, Schäfers 2004). Frictional costs are defined as the disutility that the consumer 
experiences when conducting an online transaction, such as submitting an offer (Hann and Terwiesch 
2003). Such information can then be used to build Decision Support Systems or tools for market 
analyses (see e.g. Bernhardt and Hinz 2005; Van Heijst, Potharst and van Wezel 2008). Multiple 
bidding is more useful for market research purposes since every additional bid reveals more 
information about the bidder’s characteristics. In this paper, we therefore focus on multiple bidding in 
NYOP channels. 
However, estimating frictional costs requires an appropriate modelling of their impact on bidding 
behaviour. Frictional costs can either be modelled as absolute costs subtracted from consumer surplus 
or as a relative factor that discounts surplus. In the first case the frictional costs are modelled as 
absolute costs in monetary terms. For example, a buyer that is willing to pay 100 USD for a product is 
successful with his second bid b of 80 USD. In case he faces frictional costs s of 2 USD, his realized 
consumer surplus is CS=(100 USD-80 USD)-2*2 USD=16 USD. 
In the second case the consumer surplus CS is discounted by a factor 1-δ (with 0<δ<1) and the 
numbers of bids n that were necessary to surpass the secret threshold price, e.g. CS=(WTP-b)*δ
n
. Let 
us assume the buyer has a willingness-to-pay of 100 USD and his second bid (hence n=2) of 80 USD 
is successful. Further assume that the frictional costs factor is δ=0.9. Then the buyer’s consumer 
surplus is CS=(100 USD-80 USD)*0.9²=16.2 USD.  
These two modelling approaches are both used in various academic papers and are applied in 
sophisticated decision support tools (e.g. Cramton 1984, Hann and Terwiesch 2003). However, it is 
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not clear which one of those two approaches fits better and whether the models lead to different 
implications. The aim of this paper is therefore to address these questions. We apply both models to 
bidding data from a German NYOP seller for flights from Germany to Majorca (Spain). At this NYOP 
seller, prospective buyers are allowed to submit an unlimited number of bids if their previous bids are 
rejected. They have to wait, on average, about 15 minutes for information about the acceptance or 
rejection of their bids. It is straightforward, that waiting infers some inconvenience on the bidders and 
waiting is costly and can be modelled either as a discount or an absolute loss in consumer surplus. 
The remainder of this paper is therefore as follows: Next, we discuss the previous research that is 
relevant for this paper. In section 3 we present the bidding model and distinguish between absolute 
and relative frictional costs. Both models are then applied to a unique dataset from a German NYOP 
seller that allowed an infinite number of bids. We compare the different estimation results and 
evaluate the different measurement approaches. We conclude the paper with implications for research 
and practice. 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
2.1 Frictional Costs 
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) define frictional costs as the disutility related to the conduct of an online 
transaction. Thus, frictional costs can accrue through the consumer‘s decision-making process prior to 
an online transaction, e.g. optimizing his bids at an NYOP seller, the consumer’s prior search effort or 
through the process of actually submitting the bid via a user-interface (Spann et al. 2004). Therefore, 
frictional costs are closely related to search costs and the modelling of consumers’ search behaviour. 
Consumer search behaviour can be modelled as a sequential decision on engaging in initial and 
possible further search steps (Ratchford, 1982). More specific, models of consumer search behaviour 
observe the problem of a consumer who faces varying and unknown prices at different sellers for the 
product she wants to buy (Stigler, 1961). Because of this, the consumer has to search for the best price 
at different sellers, with the search process being costly (Stigler, 1961). Based on the tradeoff between 
the additional revenue of search in the form of a lower price and the additional costs associated with 
search, the basic economic decision rule is as follows: The consumer performs an additional search 
step if the expected revenue of the search step is greater than the costs which occur in this search step 
(Goldman & Johansson, 1978; Weitzman, 1979). 
In these models, the consumer assumes that prices at different sellers follow a certain distribution (in 
most cases a uniform distribution), enabling her to calculate the expected revenue of the search step 
(Ratchford, 1982). After each search step, the consumer updates the assumed price distribution based 
on the prices found in the previous search steps (Rothschild, 1974; Weitzman, 1979). Therefore, 
consumers determine the expected revenue of an additional search step based on the knowledge of 
their WTP and their assumptions about the price distribution. They carry out an additional search step 
if the expected revenue of this step is positive and exceeds the cost of search. 
2.2 Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions 
Likewise auctions, the innovative interactive pricing mechanism NYOP gained attention in academics 
from different disciplines.  
In IS research, Hann and Terwiesch (2003) were the first that examined NYOP as a possibility to 
impute the frictional cost parameters for consumers by using the observed bidding behaviour at an 
NYOP seller. They model frictional costs as an absolute parameter that is subtracted from the utility a 
consumer receives when a deal is made. Hann and Terwiesch (2003) find that the frictional costs in E-
Commerce are substantial with median values ranging from EUR 3.54 for a portable digital music 
player (MP3) to EUR 6.08 for a personal digital assistant (PDA). This concept of absolute frictional 
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costs is extended in Terwiesch, Savin and Hann (2005) where the authors derive implications for an 
NYOP seller regarding the optimal setting of the secret threshold price. 
Spann, Skiera and Schäfers (2004) show how NYOP can be used for market research and develop an 
analytical model that accounts for absolute frictional costs and willingness-to-pay. They apply their 
model to use the observed bids in order to estimate the individual’s willingness-to-pay, beliefs about 
the threshold price and the frictional costs in absolute terms. This model is extended in Spann and 
Tellis (2006) to test the rationality of bidding behaviour at two different NYOP sellers. 
Ding et al. (2005) examine the impact of expected excitement at winning and frustration at losing on 
bids in an NYOP channel. Since they apply a single bid policy in their laboratory experiments, no 
frictional costs are considered.  
Further, several analytical papers study NYOP. Fay (2004) analyzes the optimal design of an NYOP 
auction in case buyers may use multiple identities and thus learn more about the secret reserve price. 
Wang, Gal-Or and Chatterjee (2009) study the key trade-offs driving the decision by a service 
provider to employ an NYOP channel or not. Amaldoss and Jain (2008) analyze joint bidding for 
multiple items at a reverse-pricing retailer. These studies enhance our understanding of the optimal 
design of NYOP but they do not estimate frictional costs. 
Hinz and Spann (2008) relaxed the assumption that bidders do not communicate and information 
about previous bids is not available before submitting a bid. They examine information diffusion 
through social networks and show that exogenously acquired information significantly influences 
bidding behaviour. Moreover, the authors show in a field study that some bidders are at an advantage 
through their social position in the network. Bidders with higher centrality are more likely to bid 
closer to the secret threshold price since they have a higher likelihood to receive useful information 
about previous bids. Hinz and Spann (2008), however, do not consider frictional costs in their paper 
and focus on the single bid case. 
In contrast to modelling absolute frictional costs, Hinz, Hann and Spann (2009) introduce a model that 
is based on the idea of discounting which is commonly used in Economics (e.g. Cramton 1984, 
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002) and apply it to the field of information systems. They 
allow an infinite number of bids and test the prediction accuracy of the model in a laboratory study 
and a field study with real purchases. 
This leads to the question whether the modelling of absolute or relative frictional costs leads to better 
results and what implications does the modelling approach have on decision making. We therefore 
introduce both modelling approaches in detail in the next section before we apply them to a unique 
dataset of a German NYOP seller in section 4. 
3 MODELLING APPROACHES 
In NYOP a seller first decides about the secret threshold price and the number of possible bids (single 
or multiple). Prospective buyers must then decide whether they want to enter the bidding process or 
not. If a prospective buyer is willing to accept the frictional costs and expects a positive consumer 
surplus, she can place the bid which is rejected if it does not meet or surpass the secret threshold price. 
Otherwise the bid is accepted and the transaction is initiated. If the bid is rejected, the prospective 
buyer may place an additional bid depending on the number of allowed bids. She has to, however, 
consider again the frictional costs and must deliberate whether she wants to accept these costs or 
whether she wants to stop bidding without reaching an agreement. Figure 1 depicts the process 
(process parts at the seller’s side are marked grey while process parts at the buyer’s side are in white). 
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Figure 1. Bidding Process in the Name-Your-Own-Price mechanism 
Economic intuition suggests that consumers with low frictional costs are more likely to submit bids 
using small increments, and consumers with high frictional costs are more likely to submit bids in 
large increments (Hann and Terwiesch 2003). If bidding was frictionless, consumers could identify the 
threshold price by incrementing their bid in small steps in each round, leaving little surplus to the 
seller. Vice versa the NYOP seller can infer from the bidding behaviour the frictional costs that 
bidders have to face. This information can be used to optimize the design of the website or the optimal 
setting of the secret threshold price (Terwiesch, Savin and Hann 2005).  
We introduce the economic model which describes the optimal bidding behaviour from a buyer’s 
perspective. We assume the following: The buyer has a willingness-to-pay WTP for a given product 
that is on sale by an NYOP-seller. We assume that buyers correctly expect an exogenous and constant 
threshold price of the seller. Buyers are considered to be risk-neutral.  
The decision rule is that a prospective buyer submits a bid b for a product if the expected consumer 
surplus ECS of the bid is positive. However, the prospective buyer has to account for frictional costs 
that can either enter as absolute costs c or as a discount factor 1-δ (with 0<δ<1). The bidder wants to 
maximize his expected consumer surplus ECS by optimizing his bid. 
The bid amount influences both, the surplus and the success probability. The success probability 
depends on the buyer’s assumption regarding the probability distribution g(pT) of the unknown 
threshold price pT. Hereby, the buyer increases his success probability by increasing the amount of the 
bid. However, at the same time, a higher bid decreases consumer surplus in case of a successful bid. 
The buyer optimizes the expected consumer surplus of the bid ECS over the bid amount. Buyers have 
a reservation price r for the product. This reservation price is determined by prospective buyer’s 
willingness-to-pay WTP. However, in case a buyer expects a highest possible value for the secret 
threshold price which is below her willingness-to-pay, she will use this highest expected threshold 
price value as reservation price. 
Prospective buyer’s decision: 
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The buyer’s belief regarding the probability distribution gj(pT) can have different functional forms 
including a normal distribution or a uniform distribution. We can derive a closed form solution for the 
consumer’s optimal bid in case of a uniform distribution of the expected threshold price on the interval 
[LB, UB]. This assumption is in line with Stigler (1961), Hann and Terwiesch (2003), and Ding et al. 
(2005) and results also hold for the most common distributional assumptions. In case of the uniform 
distribution between a lower bound LB and an upper bound UB, the probability density for the secret 
threshold price pT is 1/(UB-LB). 
We then can easily derive the optimal bid for both models. We will first derive the optimal bid for 
absolute frictional costs, thus c>0. In section  3.2 we derive the optimal bidding behaviour when 
frictional costs are captured through a discount factor 1-δ (with 0<δ<1). 
3.1 Optimal Bidding Behaviour when Frictional Costs are modelled as Absolute Costs  
For expositional easy, we start with the single bid case. The prospective buyer has only one chance to 
surpass the secret threshold price and thus submits one optimal b*.  
1
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If prospective buyers can submit two bids, the optimal bidding behavior is as follows: 
1 1
1 1 2( )
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The first part of the term equals the expected consumer surplus if the first bid b1 surpasses the 
threshold price. If the bid b1 is rejected, then the prospective buyer knows that the secret threshold 
price must be higher than b1. Using Bayesian updating the new lower bound equals the rejected bid b1 
and thus the second bid b2 is higher than the first bid. 
The (unrestricted) optimization of this equation for the two-bid model results in the following 








b LB c WTP
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b LB c WTP
∗ = + +   
The optimal bidding behaviour can easily be determined for more than 2 bids. See Spann, Skiera and 
Schäfers (2004) who derived the optimal bids for up to 6 possible bids. 
3.2 Optimal Bidding Behaviour when Frictional Costs are modelled as Discount Factor  
We use the same assumptions as before but replace the absolute frictional costs c with relative 
frictional costs modelled as discount factor 1-δ (with 0<δ<1). For the single bid case the expected 
consumer surplus that needs to be maximized from a buyer’s perspective is given as: 
1
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This means that in the single bid case there are no differences between the outcomes of the two 
models. The outcomes in terms of optimal bidding, however, change when more bids are allowed. For 




 are given by: 
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This can be extended analogously to the n-bid case (details on the optimal bids for higher bid cases are 
available upon request from the authors). 
4 EMPIRICAL STUDY  
The aim of this empirical study is the empirical comparison of the two different modeling approaches 
for frictional costs. Therefore, we compare the estimations of frictional costs as well as individual 
WTP and the assumptions about the distribution of the threshold price for the empirical data of a 
name-your-own-price seller (Spann et al. 2004). Thus, we test the applicability of both modeling 
approaches with respect to their convergent validity and how well they fit the data. 
We use the observed bid sequences of a bidder to estimate his or her characteristics, i.e., frictional 
costs, willingness-to-pay and assumptions about the threshold price distribution. For the estimation of 
absolute frictional costs, we use the approach of Spann et al. (2004). Thereby, we fit the predicted 
sequence of bids according to the optimal bidder behaviour to the observed bid sequence, thus 
imputing the bidders’ characteristics via least squares estimation. The optimal bidding behaviour is 
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derived according to the models for absolute and frictional costs outlined in section 3 above, 
respectively.  
Since we estimate four consumer specific parameters, we need at least an equal number of 
observations (i.e. bids) per consumer for the model to be identified. We further assume constant 
frictional costs across all search bids of a consumer. Thus, we can use all consumers who submit at 
least four bids. 
We empirically compare the two modelling approaches by analyzing the bidding data from a German 
NYOP seller for flights from Germany to Majorca (Spain) for a eight month period. At this NYOP 
seller, consumers are allowed to submit an unlimited number of bids if their previous bids are rejected. 
They have to wait, on average, about 15 minutes for information about the acceptance or rejection of 
their bids. Since Spann et al. (2004) used this data set before, we can compare their estimates for the 
model of absolute frictional costs to the estimates from a model with relative frictional costs. 
Table 1 and Table 2 display the estimation results for the two models for consumers with four, five or 
six bids. It is interesting to note that the mean, min and max estimates of willingness-to-pay are almost 
identical between the two models. The estimate upper and lower bound for the distribution of the 
threshold price are similar, but slightly lower in the model with relative frictional costs compared to 
the model with absolute frictional costs. The model with absolute frictional costs estimates a mean 
value of 6.23 DM for these costs per bid. Contrary, the model with relative frictional costs measures a 
discount rate of 1-80.64%=19.36%. This value is rather high and is another evidence for hyperbolic 
discounting, meaning that consumers highly discount delayed outcomes (see e.g. Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). However, the absolute values for frictional costs are also rather 
high. This indicates that the approaches are comparable. The average fit of the estimated bids 











Mean 353.07 441.25 177.94 6.23 
Standard Deviation 90.68 282.97 68.40 7.95 
Minimum 129.00 212.30 0.00 0.00 






Note: Results for 68 consumers with four, five or six bids for a flight from Germany to Majorca.  











Mean 355.24 410.03 152.03 80.64 
Standard Deviation 96.14 107.12 86.66 34.91 
Minimum 125.00 150.00 0.00 0.00 






Note: Results for 68 consumers with four, five or six bids for a flight from Germany to Majorca.  
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Relative Frictional Costs  
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We find a correlation of .360 (p<.01) between the estimated willingness-to-pay and absolute frictional 
costs but only a correlation of .091 (p>.4) between the estimated willingness-to-pay and relative 
frictional costs. As expected, we observe that bidders with high willingness-to-pay have higher 
frictional costs. Waiting is more costly for them than for bidders with lower willingness-to-pay, thus 
increasing the opportunity costs of time. This finding is in line with previous research in management 
science (e.g., Tellis 1986) and indicates that a model that captures this relation through a discount 
factor is reasonable. If frictional costs are measured through a discount factor, we find that the 
correlation is not significantly different from zero. Thus, the relative discount factor adequately 
captures the relationship between willingness-to-pay and frictional costs.  
5 CONCLUSION  
In this paper we show how frictional costs can be measured in absolute or relative terms in an 
application for NYOP markets. Both models are equally parsimonious and our results indicate that 
both models deliver similar results in terms of model fit (i.e., explained variance: see R²-values). 
Further, the parameter estimates for the remaining three other bidders’ characteristics, i.e. willingness-
to-pay and beliefs about the secret threshold price seem to be quite robust for the different model 
specifications.  
Both models can be used to infer the bidders’ characteristics based on the observed bidding behaviour. 
This data can either be used for market research and pricing decisions or for the optimization of web 
sites. Since frictional costs measure the inconvenience that prospective buyers have to face, it can also 
be used to evaluate the optimality of the bidding process enabled by the applied software. These 
frictional costs are foregone surplus for both market sides. For example NYOP sellers like Priceline 
could optimize their website and thus the bidding process to decrease the frictional costs for their 
bidders. This allows higher surpluses for both, prospective buyers and seller (in this case Priceline). 
Interestingly, Priceline introduced a support tool for consumer decision making in form of a link “Not 
Sure What to Bid?” where prospective buyers can compare prices. Another example is Gimahhot.de, a 
German negotiation platform, where new products are on sale through a double auction mechanism 
and where frictional costs are also substantial. This platform provides a suggested bid value and an 
evaluation of bid values which is given before the submission. This saves haggling time for both 
market sides and thus lowers frictional costs (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Tool to Decrease Frictional Costs in Bidding Processes 
Such features are most likely helpful and should decrease the frictional costs. Since high valuation 
buyers have high frictional costs, an optimization would especially help to increase the utility of these 
valuable prospects. It would be interesting to measure frictional costs (either in absolute or relative 
terms) before the introduction of such a feature and afterwards. This would allow for the calculation of 
the monetary value of such software changes. Further, since suggested bid values are also external 
reference prices for bidders, reference price effects of such tools need to be delineated from the effects 
of reduced frictional costs. In any case, both effects appear to be beneficial for the seller if reference 
prices induce higher bid values (Wolk and Spann 2008) as well as less deadweight loss due to 
decreased frictional costs. The study of these aspects opens interesting avenues for future research.  
Our approach presented can also be used in IS research in other contexts. For example, 
microeconomic models like the bidding model presented here, can be used to improve the quality of 
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business processes and further can be used to calculate the utility of software improvements in 
monetary terms. This should help IT project managers to justify their development costs. 
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